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In this paper, we propose a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol based on only a
two-dimensional Hilbert space encoding a quantum system and independent devices between
the equipment for state preparation and measurement. Our protocol is inspired by the fully
device-independent quantum key distribution (FDI-QKD) protocol and the measurement-device-
independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) protocol. Our protocol only requires the state
to be prepared in the two dimensional Hilbert space, which weakens the state preparation assump-
tion in the original MDI-QKD protocol. More interestingly, our protocol can overcome the detection
loophole problem in the FDI-QKD protocol, which greatly limits the application of FDI-QKD. Hence
our protocol can be implemented with practical optical components.
Introduction - The unconditional security of a perfect
quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol [1] has been
proved by applying entanglement distillation technology
and an information theory approach[2–4]. Unfortunately,
in practice a practical QKD system is usually composed
of imperfect devices. For example, a real source emits
weak coherent pulses, which contain multiple photons
and will leak the secret key information[5]. A wavelength
dependent beam splitter may leak the basis information
[6], since it can be controlled by Eve to apply a man-
in-the-middle attack. More generally, the imperfect de-
vice in a practical QKD system may be controlled by
Eve, so that unconditional security of QKD can not be
guaranteed[7].
Since it is difficult to include all possible imperfections
in a security analysis model, fully device-independent
quantum key distribution (FDI-QKD) is a very hot topic
since it can defend against all attacks introduced by im-
perfect quantum devices [8–12]. The FDI-QKD protocol
requires a violation of the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt
(CHSH) [13] inequality between two remote parties Alice
and Bob; then unconditional security of the secret key
can be guaranteed by quantum mechanics and the no-
signaling principle. However, in practical experimental
realizations, the quantum channel is lossy and the detec-
tion efficiency is restricted. Thus, the FDI-QKD protocol
is usually vulnerable to a no-fair-sampling attack, which
can introduce the detection loophole problem [14] in the
Bell test. To avoid the detection loophole problem caused
by the quantum channel loss, Lim et al. [15] proposed
a FDI-QKD protocol with a local Bell test, which re-
quires Bell tests to be carried out only locally in Alice’s
laboratory. But, it can not avoid the detection loophole
problem introduced by the limited detection efficiency.
The most vulnerable device in a practical QKD system
is the single-photon detector, which may be controlled by
Eve if she can apply a light blinding attack [16]. Recently,
motivated by the time-reversed entanglement protocol
[19, 20], a measurement-device-independent quantum key
distribution (MDI-QKD) protocol [17, 18] was proposed
to avoid the detector side channel attack. In the MDI-
QKD protocol, perfect Bennett-Brasard 1984 (BB84) [1]
quantum states are prepared on Alice’s and Bob’s sides
respectively, and then the two photons will be transmit-
ted to Eve to apply a Bell state projection measurement.
By applying the time-reversed entanglement technique,
the perfect entangled state can be assumed to be pre-
pared on Eve’s side, and then Alice and Bob perform
a perfect BB84 state measurement [1]. Correspondingly,
the final secret key can be generated after error correction
and privacy amplification. The MDI-QKD protocol can
also be realized in practice, where the actual weak coher-
ent pulse laser will not weaken the unconditional security
of the key when the decoy state method is applied.
In the spirt of the FDI-QKD protocol, we propose a
QKD protocol to weaken the state preparation assump-
tion in the MDI-QKD protocol. More precisely, we only
require the state to be prepared in the two-dimensional
Hilbert space, and Alice’s (Bob’s) encoding device is in-
dependent of Eve. In our protocol, the state measure-
ment can be assumed to be a full black box, while the
state preparation can be assumed to be a black box with a
dimension restriction. Similarly to the security analysis
method in the FDI-QKD protocol, we apply the maxi-
mal guessing probability to estimate Eve’s information.
In the final security key rate formula, the upper bound of
Eve’s information is estimated by the CHSH value vio-
lation, while Bob’s information can be calculated by the
quantum bit error rate (QBER). Before proposing our
protocol, we will give an introduction to the FDI-QKD
and MDI-QKD protocols in the following.
Fully device-independent quantum key distribution -
The FDI-QKD protocol considers two remote parties Al-
ice and Bob to share a secret key, where Alice (Bob)
privately chooses a random input number x ∈ {0, 1} (y ∈
{0, 1, 2}) and collects an output a ∈ {0, 1} ( b ∈ {0, 1}).
By considering all of the input and output random num-
bers, the data can be divided into two parts. The first
part considers the input data {x ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ {0, 1}}
and the corresponding output data {a, b}, which can be
2used for estimating the CHSH value. While the second
part considers the input data {x = 0, y = 2} and the
corresponding output data {a, b}, which can be used for
estimating the QBER and generating the final secret key.
More precisely, Alice and Bob determine the conditional
probabilities {p(a, b|x, y), a, b, x, y ∈ {0, 1}} to estimate
the practical CHSH value g as the following equation
g =
∑
a,b,x,y(−1)a+b+xyp(a, b|x, y), (1)
where the local hidden variable (LHV) bound of g is 2,
while the quantum non-local theory guarantee that g ≤
2
√
2. From considerations of quantum mechanics, the
conditional probability value can be given by
p(a, b|x, y) = Tr(ρAxa ⊗Byb) x, y, a, b ∈ {0, 1}, (2)
where ρ is the state shared between Alice and Bob, Axa
and Byb are measurement operators with the input pa-
rameters {x, y} and the output parameters {a, b} respec-
tively. Note that, projective measurements can be as-
sumed without loss of generality due to the fact that the
quantum dimension has no restriction. The degree of un-
predictability of Alice’s measurement outcome a can be
quantified by the maximal guessing probability (Bob’s
measurement outcome b can be analyzed similarly)
pguess(a) = maxap(a|x) = maxa
∑
b p(a, b|x, y). (3)
where the second equation use the no-signaling principle.
By applying the FDI-QKD security analysis result given
by Masanes et al. [12], the min-entropy bound of Eve’s
reduced state conditioned on Alice’s system can be given
by the following equation
Hmin(a|x,E)
= −log2pguess(a)
≥ 1− log2(1 +
√
2− g2
4
) ≡ f(g).
(4)
From this equation, we can see that Eve cannot get any
information (Hmin(a|x,E) = 1) when the CHSH value
reaches 2
√
2. If the CHSH value can be obtained from
the LHV theory, Eve can get all of the secret information
(Hmin(a|x,E) = 0). In the previous analysi, security
of the FDI-QKD protocol can be proved without any
other assumptions about the practical devices, thus the
quantum system can be assumed to be prepared in a
Hilbert space of arbitrary dimension. When the quantum
state is prepared in two dimensional Hilbert space [21],
the upper bound of the maximal guessing probability can
be given by
pguess(a) ≥ pguess(a)2dimensional , (5)
this inequality can be explained by the fact that the di-
mension of Eve’s state preparation black box has been
restricted to 2; thus she has restricted information with
which to guess Alice’s measurement outcome a compared
with the original protocol. Correspondingly, the lower
bound of the min-entropy function can be estimated by
Hmin(a|x,E)2dimensional ≥ Hmin(a|x,E). (6)
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distri-
bution - In contrast to the previous FDI-QKD proto-
col, the MDI-QKD protocol can remove all detector side
channel attacks, and has no restrictions of limited de-
tection efficiency and practical quantum channel losses.
But, the security of the original protocol relies on the
assumption that the legitimate users can perfectly char-
acterize the encoding systems. The basic idea of the
MDI-QKD protocol is to consider that Alice and Bob
to prepare the characterized states, and then the signals
interfere at a 50:50 beam splitter on Eve’s side. This is
followed by a polarizing beam splitter, and the signals are
projected into either the horizontal or vertical polariza-
tion state. An appropriate measurement can guarantee
the projection into the two Bell states |ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|HV 〉−
|V H〉) and |ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|HV 〉 + |V H〉). Following the
time-reversed entanglement idea, the original MDI-QKD
protocol can be assumed to be the entanglement-based
BB84 protocol, where the prepared state can be guaran-
teed to be the maximal entangled state, which will be
transmitted to Alice and Bob. Then Alice and Bob ap-
ply a perfectly characterized BB84 state measurement,
and the final secret key can be established after error
correction and privacy amplification. In the entangle-
ment based BB84 protocol, Eve’s information about the
final secret key can be estimated from the phase error
rate introduced in the quantum. Bob’s uncertainty about
Alice’s measurement outcome can be directly calculated
from the conditional Shannon entropy function.
Unlike the FDI-QKD protocol, the MDI-QKD proto-
col has no detection loophole restriction, which requires
Alice and Bob to have almost perfect state preparation.
However, the state preparation may have some imperfec-
tions, which cannot be discovered by the legal parties;
thus the imperfection maybe utilized by Eve to apply an
attack. Note that the security of MDI-QKD has a quan-
tum dimension restriction, and it can be easily verified
that Eve can get all of the secret key information if a
high-dimensional state has been prepared by Alice(Bob).
Thus it is a natural question to ask if MDI-QKD pro-
tocol can generate unconditional security key based only
on dimension restriction[22]. Fortunately, the answer is
positive if we consider that Alice (Bob) and Eve share
independent devices.
MDI-QKD with independent devices - We assume that
the state preparation box on Alice’s side has random clas-
sical input number x and hidden variable λA, which can
be used to decide Alice’s state preparation ρx,λA . Sim-
ilarly, the state preparation σy,λB on Bob’s side can be
controlled by the hidden variable λB and input random
number y. Unlike in the original MDI-QKD protocol, we
3do not need to perfectly characterize the state prepara-
tion process, and we also require that Alice (Bob) and
Eve share independent devices, which can be illustrated
by the following equations
P (λA|B) = P (λA|E) = P (λA),
P (λB |A) = P (λB |E) = P (λB),
P (λE |A) = P (λE |B) = P (λE),
(7)
where λE is the hidden variable controlled by Eve’s de-
vice. In the independent-devices model [23], we can easily
prove that Alice’s (Bob’s) state should be prepared using
the input number x (y) and hidden variable λA (λB); nei-
ther of them can be controlled or known by Eve’s device.
Because of the independent devices, Eve cannot control
or know the state preparation on Alice and Bob’s sides
through the hidden variable λE , and it can easily be ver-
ified that the MDI-QKD protocol has no security if the
hidden variable λA (λB) in the state preparation black
box is controlled by Eve.
We first consider that pure states have been prepared
by Alice and Bob in the two dimensional Hilbert space
with given input numbers x, y ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11},
Alice : {|φ00〉λA , |φ01〉λA , |φ10〉λA , |φ11〉λA},
Bob : {|φ00〉λB , |φ01〉λB , |φ10〉λB , |φ11〉λB}, (8)
where the state preparation can be assumed to be con-
trolled only by the input numbers.
More generally, when mixed states have been prepared
by Alice and Bob in the two dimensional Hilbert space
with input numbers x, y ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}, the detailed
state preparation sets on Alice’s and Bob’s sides can be
given by
Alice : {∑λA
√
pλA |φ00〉λA |λA〉,∑
λA
√
pλA |φ01〉λA |λA〉,∑
λA
√
pλA |φ10〉λA |λA〉,∑
λA
√
pλA |φ11〉λA |λA〉},
Bob : {∑λB
√
pλB |φ00〉λB |λB〉,∑
λB
√
pλB |φ01〉λB |λB〉,∑
λB
√
pλB |φ10〉λB |λB〉,∑
λB
√
pλB |φ11〉λB |λB〉},
(9)
where
∑
λA
pλA =
∑
λB
pλB = 1. The mixed state is
prepared by considering different hidden variables λA and
λB . For example, if Alice receives the input number 00,
the mixed state
∑
λA
pλA |φ00〉〈φ00|λA will be transmitted
to Eve correspondingly.
To relax the state preparation limitation in the MDI-
QKD protocol, we propose our protocol as shown in Fig.
1. Note that we assume the state preparation and mea-
surement boxes are independent, which is reasonable in
practical experimental realization. We must take this
assumption since Eve cannot distinguish any pure state
|φ〉λA (|φ〉λB ) from Alice’s (Bob’s) encoding ensembles via
the LHV λA (λB); thus any pure state |φ〉λA (|φ〉λB ) will
be treated equally by Eve.
FIG. 1: Quantum key distribution based on the quantum
dimension and independent devices
Our protocol is illustrated in Fig.1. The detailed steps
are described as follows:
Step 1. State preparation: Alice prepares two sets of
quantum states {ρ00, ρ01} and {ρ10, ρ11} in the two di-
mensional Hilbert space, then she randomly chooses one
of the quantum states, which will be sent to Eve in the
middle of the quantum channel. Similarly, Bob prepares
three sets of quantum states {σ00, σ01}, {σ10, σ11} and
{σ20, σ21}, then he randomly chooses one of the quan-
tum states, which will be sent to Eve in the middle of
the quantum channel.
Without loss of generality, in practical experimental re-
alization, we can assume that {ρ00, ρ01} are eigenstates
of the Pauli operator matrix Z, and {ρ00, ρ01} are eigen-
states of the Pauli operator matrix X . {σ00, σ01} are
eigenstates of the operator matrix −Z−X√
2
, {σ10, σ11} are
eigenstates of the operator matrix Z−X√
2
, and {σ20, σ21}
are eigenstates of the pauli operator matrix Z.
Step 2. State measurement: By considering all of Al-
ice’s state preparation sets and Bob’s first two sets of
state preparation, Alice and Bob save the classical data
when Eve gets the measurement corresponding to the
projection into the Bell state |ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|HV 〉 − |V H〉).
The measurement results will be noted as the set S1.
Similarly, by considering Alice’s first state prepara-
tion set and Bob’s third state preparation set, Alice and
Bob save the classical data when Eve gets the measure-
ment corresponding to the projection into the Bell states
|ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|HV 〉+|V H〉) and |ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|HV 〉−|V H〉).
The measurement result will be noted as set S2. Note
that Bob should flip his bit value, so that the classical
bit 0 (1) will be changed to bit 1 (0).
Step 3. CHSH and QBER value estimation: Alice and
Bob apply the set S1 to estimate the CHSH value g, and
the QBER value e can also be estimated by applying the
4set S2.
Step 4. Error correction and privacy amplification: By
applying an error correction code, Alice and Bob can es-
tablish an identical classical binary number to eliminate
the bit error. Since Eve can get secret key information
from the error correction step and the non-maximally vi-
olated CHSH value, Alice and Bob construct the final
secret key by applying a privacy amplification protocol.
Security analysis model and final secret key rate - To
analyze our protocol, we can assume it to be realized in
the following way (Bob’s state preparation can be an-
alyzed similarly), Alice first prepares a pair of systems
in the singlet state. If she wishes to prepare state |ψ〉,
she will measure one particle in the basis {|ψ〉, |ψ⊥〉},
and the other particle will also collapse to one of these
states. Based on the measurement outcomes, the sec-
ond quantum state will be sent to Eve if Alice gets the
measurement outcome |ψ〉, while the singlet state will be
discarded if Alice gets the measurement outcome |ψ⊥〉.
These two cases are demarcated by fragments (1) and
(2) in Fig. 2. The quantum state prepared with the two
different protocols cannot be distinguished, thus security
of the two protocols is equivalent,
Without loss of generality, we can assume that the sin-
glet states are prepared by Eve in fragment (3), then she
will send one of these states to Alice. By applying the
corresponding two-dimensional state measurement, Alice
informs Eve that she should save the measurement out-
comes if she gets the quantum state |ψ〉. Note that Eve is
more powerful than in the previous protocol, thus secu-
rity of the original protocol is not weakened in the present
protocol. Next we transform the protocol in fragment
(3) to the one in fragment (4). By considering the state
measurement equipment as a black box, we have the pro-
tocol shown in fragment (4). Note that Eve’s ability will
be enhanced in fragment (4). Obviously, this protocol in
fragment (4) can be assumed to be a DI-QKD protocol,
in which we can apply the CHSH value to estimate Eve’s
information.
The main difficulty in this work is to obtain the final
secret key rate. We first calculate the final key rate with
pure state preparation on Alice’s and Bob’s sides respec-
tively. Combining the CHSH value g with the QBER
value e, we can get the final secret key rate R from the
following formula
R ≥ Hmin(a|x, λA, λB, E)2dimension −H(a|b¯, λA, λB)S2
≥ Hmin(a|x, λA, λB, E)− h(e)
= Hmin(a|x)− h(e)
≥ 1− log2(1 +
√
2− g2
4
)− h(e),
(10)
where h(x) = −xlog2(x)−(1−x)log2(1−x) is the binary
entropy function, b¯ is the bit flip value of b, the second
inequality can be obtained by utilizing the formula (6).
Since the state preparation can be controlled only by the
input random number, the third equation can be proved
simply by considering the formula (8).
FIG. 2: The relationship between the MDI-QKD protocol
and the DI-QKD protocol. In fragments (2) and (3), the
singlet state will be discarded to garbage when Alice or Bob
gets the unmatched measurement outcome. In the MDI-QKD
protocol, Alice(Bob) has the input number x = (x1, x2)(y =
(y1, y2)), which can be transformed into input number x1(y1)
and measurement outcome x2(y2) in the DI-QKD protocol.
As in the pure state preparation case, the final secret
key rate with mixed state prepation can be given by
R ≥ ∑ pλApλB{Hmin(a|x, λA, λB, E)2dimension
−H(a|b¯, λA, λB)S2}
≥ ∑ pλApλB{Hmin(a|x, λA, λB , E)−H(a|b¯, λA, λB)S2}
≥ ∑ pλApλB{−log2pguess(aλA,λB )− h(eλA,λB )}
≥ ∑ pλApλBf(gλA,λB )− h(
∑
pλApλBeλA,λB )
≥ f(∑ pλApλBgλA,λB )− h(
∑
pλApλBeλA,λB )
= f(g)− h(e)
= 1− log2(1 +
√
2− g2
4
)− h(e),
(11)
where gλA,λB and eλA,λB are the CHSH and QBER values
with given hidden variables λA and λB respectively. In
practical experimental realizations, the observed CHSH
value is g =
∑
pλApλBgλA,λB , and the observed QBER
5value is e =
∑
pλApλBeλA,λB . The fourth inequality is
based on the concave function h(e), and the fifth inequal-
ity is based on the convex function f(g).
We calculate the final secret key rate with different
QBER and CHSH inequality values in Fig. 3.
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FIG. 3: Final secret key rate with different QBER and CHSH
value
From the calculation result, we can see that the max-
imal tolerable QBER can reach nearly 0.5 if the CHSH
value reaches 2
√
2, while the maximal tolerable QBER is
0 if the CHSH value can be explained by the LHV theory.
The calculation result shows that this protocol is much
more robust than the previous MDI-QKD protocol when
g approaches a high value.
In our security analysis, we assume that the state pre-
pared on Alice’s (Bob’s) side has no correlation with
the previous or the following state. Where the prepared
quantum states can be assumed to be uncorrelated with
each other, the eavesdropper and hidden variables have
no memory in Alice and Bob’s devices, and thus the
quantum de Finetti theorem [24] can be directly applied
to make our protocol secure against the most general
attack. Other applications of this protocol and a more
general security analysis are interesting open questions
for future research.
Conclusion - We propose a QKD protocol, the security
of which is based only on quantum states prepared in
the two dimensional Hilbert space and the independent
of devices between Alice (Bob) and Eve. Our protocol
can also be practically realized with current experimental
technology.
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